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1   Introduction 
 
Commentators variously infer or describe the nexus of modern Information Technology 
law (hereafter, IT law) as lying with computers
3, software
4 or the Internet
5: what they 
have in common is that they identify this nexus as being technological, not legal.  One can 
regard IT Law, therefore, as sitting on the shifting sands of technology, rather than on 
the traditional, firm regulatory bedrock, which, naturally, poses some difficulty when 
trying to define what constitutes IT law
6.  This mutability, in the view of the authors, 
means that the academic, the practitioner and the law-maker should all be cautious about 
trying to define IT law by reference to specific technologies (e.g. personal computers, the 
Internet, etc.).  This, we would argue, is inflexible, technologically-determinist and is 
reflective neither of the history of IT law nor its future development.  Instead, the 
authors posit that two general technological developments (and the unfolding legal 
responses to how their application evolves) define the boundaries of modern IT law: 
digitisation
7 and the networked computer
8. Indeed, it is the combination of digitisation with 
the mass communicative characteristic of the networked computer that, in our view, has 
both expanded and decentralised the capacity to reproduce, control, distribute and 
publish information and that gives rise to the fast-moving nature and the regulatory 
challenges at the heart of modern IT law.  
 
In this essay the authors offer a critical appraisal of modern IT law and its development, 
from a UK-centric perspective.  The legal and technological importance of other 
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3 Please note that throughout this essay the term ‘computer’ is used to refer to digital computers; i.e. 
programmable electronic devices that process, store and retrieve digital data, comprising hardware (the 
tangible components) and software (the intangible instructions).  Obvious modern examples of computers 
include personal computers (PCs) but today computers are embedded in a wide range of products, ranging 
from cars and mobile phones to kitchen ovens. 
4 As noted above, software is the intangible element of a computer (or, indeed, a computer network).  
Software is extremely pervasive today.  For example, using the University of Southampton PC to draft this 
essay involved an operating system (Microsoft XP), an application (Microsoft Word) and online resources 
were accessed via a web browser (Microsoft Internet Explorer).  The authors were able to ‘see’ their work 
on a computer screen thanks to a GUI (a graphical user interface, one of the functions of Microsoft XP) 
and were able to exchange drafts using e-mail (Microsoft Office Outlook).  As this basic (albeit Microsoft-
heavy) example illustrates, software can be multi-layered.  It is also important to realise that the technical 
standards (or protocols) that enable computers to connect and for data to be exchanged frequently take the 
form of software, e.g. TCP/IP (see footnote 34 below) or the MP3 format (MP3 being a standard for the 
compression of digital auditory content).  
5 A definition of the term ‘Internet’ is provided at footnote 42, below.  
6 See section 2.1 below. 
7 Digital content is functionally flexible (inasmuch as it can be easily manipulated and changed and can 
embrace multi-media communication: e.g. text, visual images, audio etc.) and can be replicated without loss 
of quality  The legal challenges of digital content are explored in more detail in section 3, below. 
8 As Dewar (Dewar, A.J., (1998) “The Information Age and the Printing Press: Looking Backward to See Ahead”  
RAND paper P-8014, at p.4.) argues, the networked computer is the foundation technology of modern IT 
law - being the first true mass-market ‘many-to-many’ technology-assisted communications medium.  In 
contrast, earlier key communications technologies can be characterised as being ‘few-to-many’ (e.g. the 
printed book, radio, films and television). 
Some of the legal issues raised by networked computers are briefly considered in section 2, below.   
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jurisdictions, principally the US, is noted by way of overview only.  Although a number 
of methodologies could be used in such a task, the authors wish  to avoid mere 
description and to provide insight as well as overview; therefore both a strictly 
chronological approach
9 and a traditional intra-disciplinary approach
10 have been 
eschewed.  Instead, a more selective approach is taken; one that allows for critical 
reflection upon the symbiosis and conflict that exists between law and technology in the 
context of IT law.   
 
There are three distinct parts to this essay, each necessarily brief: context, and an 
exploration of issues within Information Technology (IT) infrastructure and IT content.  In 
section 2 the authors provide a critical overview of the academic, technological and legal 
context to IT law: thus the perennial academic question as to whether IT law is really law 
(section 2.1) is contemplated before a critical chronology of the technological-historical 
context of IT law development (section 2.2) is undertaken.  Then the boundaries (and 
sub-disciplines) of IT law (section 2.3), are considered and section 2 concludes with the 
authors proposing a UK model of regulation for modern IT law (section 2.4).  Having 
thus provided this analytical context, the authors then critically reflect upon selected 
issues pertaining to modern IT infrastructure (section 3) and contemporary IT content 
(section 4).  In section 5, the authors draw their conclusions and reflect on past, present 
and future challenges for UK IT law. 
 
It is necessary, of course, in an essay of limited length for the authors to be highly 
selective.  Thus a number of important topics are not discussed in detail. Comparative 
methodologies are not employed and neither is this intended to offer an exhaustive 
review of UK IT academic legal literature.  Nevertheless, the authors believe that this 
essay contributes useful insights as to the development of IT law up to the present day. 
The modern story of the digital revolution may not span the full 100 years of Halsbury’s 
Laws but it rightfully takes its place among the legal milestones of the latter half century 
of this important work. 
 
2 Context 
2.1  Is IT Law really Law? 
 
The authors believe that the conceptual roots of both IT and IT law can be found in the 
English academic Alan Turing’s theories of the Turing Machine and the Universal 
Machine
11: thus, functionality became independent of the tangible.  Accordingly, with the 
ever-expanding sophistication and convergence of IT we can identify the rationale of 
legal participation before us.  The law must adapt and develop to meet the new 
challenges of products, activities and behaviours that information technology (IT) 
facilitates. 
                                                 
9 To avoid a superficial and overtly technological treatment or a cursory law-led treatment. 
10 In the view of the authors, sole focus on key developments within the IT sub-disciplines – copyright law, 
data protection, etc., - would be inappropriate in a work of this length, and would fail to provide an 
effective overview of IT Law. 
11 Details of both the Universal Machine and the Turing machine theory were first published as Turing, 
A.M, “On Computable Numbers with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem”, Proceedings of the 
London Mathematical Society, Series 2, Vol.42 (1936-37) pp.230-265.  Both ‘machines’ are in fact abstract 
mathematical/philosophical constructs: for our purposes the import of the Turing Machine lies in its 
‘programmable’ features (i.e. it was the first conceptualisation of software): thus providing the model for 
the digital computer.  The Universal Machine (simply a Turing Machine able to ‘read’ and ‘interact’ with 
any other Turing Machine) prefigures modern concepts of computer communication, networking and 
convergence. 
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So, in answer to the question - is IT law really law? - the response must be very strongly 
that it is. Law must adapt to the new methodologies, norms and values of the present 
and within that process of adaptation can be found connections that bind legal 
development within fields of human endeavour.  IT law emerged as a topic for academic 
study in the 1970’s
12 and embedded itself within commercial legal practice and 
academia
13 in the 1980’s.  The 1990’s saw convergence of technology, media, 
telecommunications and trade segments of activity within legal practice as well as within 
the manufacturing and service sectors supporting innovation and technological advance.  
These trends continue today as IT ever more deeply embeds itself into the fabric of daily 
life.  The result, in legal terms, is of new legal rules and practices that have been 
specifically motivated and generated by the online world.  Principles valid offline must 
now be adapted or redesigned for the digital environment.  In this sense IT Law has 
become pervasive of law itself.  
 
On the other hand, just as is the case with other legal fields, a selective process can be 
undertaken to define those laws and legal issues that owe their rationale to IT and can 
therefore be grouped in various ways for the purposes of academic study and 
understanding (see section 2.3, below).  That is the position today.  Thirty years on from 
its beginnings, IT Law is certainly advancing the case that is has a place among the 
established fields of academic legal study.  Text books have been written in which the 
core principles that bind the field together have been exposed and discussed.  Yet the 
significance of the question, as opposed to the conclusion, as to whether IT law is really 
law must be questioned.  This debate, once popular amongst academics, is not one that 
the ordinary consumer or legal practitioner much cares about.  While it may be fine for 
academics to assert the principles they say bind IT Law into a coherent body of 
regulation worthy of academic study, the more important question relates to the 
adequacy and suitability of that regulation within the body of law as a whole.  That 
remains a much harder question to answer tempered as it always must be with the ever 
present problem of the speed of the digital advance and the human ingenuity applied to 
its application. 
 
In summary, the authors response to the question – is IT law really law? – is (to 
paraphrase Descartes
14) to suggest that since IT law is both practised and taught, 
therefore it is a defined body of law. 
 
2.2  A Critical Technological Historical Chronology and Overview 
 
As noted at the beginning of this essay, the authors argue that it is within the confines of 
digital content and networks that modern IT law is placed.  Within this paradigm, the 
authors posit that the development of modern IT - i.e. the innovations of the 
Information Age - can be characterised into five eras in the UK, each posing distinctive 
technological and legal challenges, as indicated in the sub-sections below. 
 
                                                 
12 Early UK pioneers in IT academia included Professor Harry Bloom’s work at the University of Kent  at 
Canterbury in the early 1970s. 
13 For example, the first undergraduate course in UK IT law was established at the University of 
Southampton in 1981. 
14 ‘Je pense, donc je suis’ or ‘I think therefore I am’.  (See Descartes’ seminal 1637 work, for example: 
Descartes, R. “Discours De La Methode,” Le Livre De Poche: Classiques, 2000). 
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It should be noted that it is very easy to become fixated in the technicalities, and the 
acronyms, of modern IT; nevertheless, some grasp of the technical context of the key 
technologies (i.e., their inter-relationship and function) is necessary in order to comment 
critically upon their significance and legal regulation.  In order to guide the reader and to 
avoid lengthy and turgid technical explanations, the authors have adopted the simplistic 
distinction between ‘pipes’ (the conduits of information technology
15) and ‘content’ 
(everything else
16).  The authors are aware that some practising IT lawyers use similar 
‘pipes/content’ analogies to define technologies, but we are not aware of any published 
work that utilises this distinction as a comprehensive tool of legal analysis.   
 
Initially, the authors chose to use the ‘pipes/content’ distinction in this essay for 
practicality
17 and for its’ legal import
18: reasons why one of the authors has previously 
used this distinction in her teaching activities.  Latterly, the authors have come to the 
conclusion that the ‘pipes/content’ distinction is even more fundamental than this.  
Much legal regulation and academic literature in IT to date is predicated on a 
‘hardware/software’ distinction
19, a distinction which is based on form, as opposed to the 
functional basis for the ‘pipes/content’ distinction.  The ‘hardware/software’ distinction 
may have served IT law well in the past, but from a technological perspective form is no 
longer a good guide to function; moreover, hardware and software are (technically) more 
seamless than ever before, so it is submitted that little regulatory insight can be gained 
from the use of the ‘hardware/software’ distinction any longer. 
 
To clarify: hardware and software pervade both ‘pipes’ and ‘content’, but ‘pipes’ 
(conduits for information) are functionally distinct from ‘content’ (information conveyed in 
said conduits).  The authors believe that the ‘pipes/content’ distinction is now the centre 
of gravity for IT development but that academic legal analysis has not yet caught up with 
this transition. 
 
2.2.1  The First Era: The Foundation of the Information Age
20 (1940 – 1968) 
 
During the tail end of the Industrial Age
21, many of the foundation technologies for the 
Information Age were developed.  Although a number of important analogue computing 
                                                 
15 Which we would define as not only including network hardware (e.g. the physical components of the 
modern telecommunications system and satellite technology) but also much software; from standards (e.g. 
the TCP/IP protocol), to search engines (e.g. Google). 
16 For example, individual digital music files using the MP3 standard, conversations made via Internet 
telephony, word-processing files etc. 
17 Being (i) shorthand for technological context (it is a simple and useful way of describing the technical 
‘place’ of a technology) and (ii) future-proof (the semantics of the pipes/content distinction is relatively 
technology-neutral). 
18 See section 3.1 for the argument that proprietary rights have a different effect on each and that the 
appropriate regulatory models may differ. 
19 E.g. see section 3 below. 
20 This essay is concerned with modern IT and modern IT law: this corresponds with the Information Age.  
Therefore, in this essay the authors do not discuss the information technologies of earlier Ages.  Had this 
been necessary, the authors would have categorised time before the Information Age as follows: (i) the 
Hunter-Gatherer Age (circa 2.5million BC – 10 000 BC), which saw the development of human speech 
and art; (ii) the Agricultural Age (circa 10 000 BC – 1700 A.D.) which saw the invention of writing and the 
first cultural depositories (prototype museums, libraries and archives), and; (iii) the Industrial Age (circa 
1700 - 1968) when printing, newspapers, photography, the typewriter, analogue computers, the postal 
system, the telephone, the phonograph, films, radio, television, the photocopier and other such 
information technologies were developed.  See further: Saxby, “The Age of Information,” (Macmillan/New 
York University Press, 1990), Chapter 2. 
21 Supra footnote 20. 
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inventions predate what the authors have termed the foundation era, it is here – circa 
1940 to 1968 – that the direct origins of the digital computer can be found.  This era is 
characterised by the fruition and progression of earlier analogue computing 
developments: key technological milestones in this era include the development of the 
stored-program computer.  There was limited commercialisation of the early non-
networked mainframe computers – such as the Ferranti Mark I computer
22 and LEO
23 - 
but computer use largely took place within public bodies.  It is noteworthy that, at the 
dawn of the Information Age, computer content was primarily numerical and many 
technological advances in this era had their genesis in the military sphere or academia.   
 
A generic regulatory approach, i.e. one not distinguishing IT from other regulatory 
subject matter, is evident in this era.  Specific, formal legal regulation of IT was absent 
and the field had not really caught the attention of UK legal academics, although there 
was a nascent US literature.  Overall, the challenges of the first era were largely 
technological with the focus on hardware development.   
 
2.2.2  The Second Era: The Dawn of the Information Age (1969 - 1979) 
 
This era saw a reduction in the size of computers, with the development of the 
microchip (also known as the semiconductor chip
24), facilitating the subsequent 
introduction of personal computers and the development of further software 
applications
25 – marking the beginning of a move of IT usage beyond government and 
industry towards a mass market.  However, computer use was still mainly institutional 
rather than personal
26; residing in academia or industrial research, but also becoming 
well-established in businesses during this time.  Although characterised by a rather 
narrow conception of IT, with particular emphasis on hardware (in the form of the 
computer), important software and network innovations took place during this period in 
the context of the development of the ARPANET
27. 
 
The authors submit that there was a vital technological normative development during 
this era, namely the establishment of the principle of openness in modern IT engineering.  
This principle was not only a key technological feature of the ARPANET ‘pipes’
28; it was 
(and still is) a defining characteristic of the process of network development - as 
evidenced by the RFC
29 (Requests for Comments) series
30.  
                                                 
22 This was based on the Manchester Mark I computer and was the world's first commercially available 
general-purpose computer. 
23 It is a little-known fact that LEO - The Lyons Electrical Office - was the world’s first business computer, 
being in use within Lyons UK in February 1953. 
24 See footnote 36 below. 
25 From this point, enabled by software development, digital content began to expand beyond tabulating 
financial data, statistics, and other numerical information.  For example, e-mail and word-processing 
software were pioneered during this era. 
26 Although at that time PCs tended to be developed and used by computer hobbyists; many such people 
becoming the workers and leaders of the then embryonic computer industry. 
27 ARPANET, the network of the US Advances Research Projects Agency (ARPA, now known as 
DARPA) went online in 1969.  It is generally accepted that the ARPANET was the precursor of the 
modern Internet, but the authors would go further to state that the ARPANET was the foundation of the 
‘pipes’, both hardware and software, of modern networked computing.  
28 Simply put, the ‘pipes’ of the ARPANET were specifically designed to be used as a platform for other 
hardware and software (as is the case with the modern Internet and the World Wide Web), thus 
decentralising network innovation and enabling third party innovation ‘above’ this platform. 
29 RFCs are a collection of documents used by computer engineers to exchange IT ideas and theories.  An 
RFC could variously constitute a work in progress, third party responses to the same or a draft proposal.  
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Interestingly, although the authors would argue that IT was perceived as being 
technologically divergent from other technologies in this era, actual legal regulation in the 
UK at this time still tended not to draw a distinction between activities (or products) 
assisted by or involving IT, and those not.  With a few exceptions, principally the 
discussion on the copyright protection of computer programs
31, there was little appetite 
for technology-specific regulation.  Technology-specific academic writings, however, did 
take hold during this era. 
 
2.2.3  The Third Era: Expansion (1980 - 1989) 
 
Although computer hardware innovations continued apace, the growing importance of 
software is notable during the third era
32, which saw the rise of key multinational 
software companies (e.g. Microsoft) and networking (e.g. Cisco Systems).  We can also 
see evidence of modern IT moving into the office and the home with the 
commercialisation of the first user-friendly applications; for example, the launch of 
word-processing programs
33.  Networks other than ARPANET began to proliferate – 
many of them rather small scale intranets, often based in academia.  ARPANET itself 
underwent a transformation
34 to become part of a ‘network of networks’ - the Internet.   
 
In the context of this significant ‘pipes’ innovation, it is only during the third era that we 
see the emergence of a technology-specific regulatory model in the UK.  This coincided 
with the establishment of the all-party Parliamentary Information Technology 
Committee (PITCOM
35) and the privatisation of UK telecoms via the 
                                                                                                                                            
The RFC series began in 1969 and quickly established a significant role in developing technical protocols 
or standards: a role that continues to this day. 
30 RFCs were first circulated by ‘snail mail’, then by e-mail.  At the present time, there are a number of web 
sites that publish an index and repository of RFCs, one of the most comprehensive being found at 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html.  
31 Both ‘pipes’ and ‘content’ software was affected by this, which is an example of existing law (copyright) 
being adapted in order to meet the perceived needs of the nascent software industry.  Although it is 
documented that software per se was being treated as being literary works within US law in 1964 (see the 
Sixty-seventh Annual Report of the Register of Copyrights.  For the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1964, Copyright Office, 
Library of Congress, Washington: 1965, at p.4) and international law accorded with this position in 1971 
(i.e., the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, as amended in 1971), 
one can also see evidence of a national imperative to reform national copyright laws in the light of software 
developments in the UK Whitford Report (Copyright and Designs Law: Report of the Committee to Consider the 
Law of Copyright and Designs, HMSO 1976), and, in the US, the CONTU Report (The National Commission 
on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works (CONTU) Report, July 31, 1976 at p.29-34), which 
resulted in, respectively, the Copyright, Designs & Patents Act 1988 in the UK and in the US in the 1976 
Copyright Act and later changes to §117 of the same. 
32 For example, the first IBM PC - IBM Acorn – went on sale in August 1981 complete with the MS-DOS 
1.0 operating system.  The Apple LISA computer (on sale in January 1983) was the first home computer 
with software that combined images, graphics and text (known as graphical user interface, or GUI) on a 
computer screen. 
33 Such as MicroPro’s WordStar – the first commercial word processing program. 
34 Chief amongst these being the development of two key network protocols, the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP).  Together, TCP and IP created a flexible and enduring 
foundation ‘language’ for the networked computer.  The TCP/IP combination was officially adopted by 
ARPANET 1983 and this is generally accepted to mark the beginning of what we now know as the 
Internet. 
35 Which has proved influential in the UK (see Sarson, R. (ed) “PICTOM at 25”, available at 
http://www.pitcom.org.uk/pitcom25web.pdf).  In more recent eras, other Associate Parliament Groups 
have been established, such as the All-Party Group on Telecommunications and the All-Party Internet 
Group (APIG). 
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Telecommunications Act 1984.  Hereafter, we begin to see increasing evidence of a 
desire to change existing laws in the UK in order to meet the perceived needs of new IT 
industries and a willingness to create new laws to the same end
36.  It is notable, however, 
that some of the latter sui generis schemes have proved to be somewhat of a regulatory 
dead end
37.   
 
Now, for the first time, a number of significant IT cases – mostly concerned with the 
application of intellectual property (IP) law to IT
38 - were litigated at the national level.  It 
is unsurprising, therefore, that the third era also marked the development of IT law as a 
separate area of practice for legal practitioners and their clients
39 and of legal teaching
40 
for the academic and student. 
 
Further legal developments enabled commercial entities to obtain proprietary interests in 
IT pipes and IT content: key exemplars here are sui generis database protection
41 and the 
patenting of software (see section 3, below). 
 
In the third era, therefore, significant challenges were posed equally to technology, law 
and legal academe. 
  
2.2.4  The Fourth Era: Transition (1990-2001) 
 
This era is characterised by two technological leaps forward – first, the ARPANET 
technically ceded to the Internet
42 in 1990 and second the user-friendly World Wide 
Web
43 was developed.  The resultant increase in digital content, correspondingly 
                                                 
36 There are examples here relating both to ‘pipes’ and ‘content’: (i) The development of data protection 
law, is probably the first example of sui generis content regulation.  It is generally accepted that Sweden and 
Norway led the development of data protection in the second era – see, for example, Bing, J. (1996) “Data 
Protection in Norway,” ( http://www.jus.uio.no/iri/forskning/lib/papers/dp_norway/dp_norway.html), but 
it was only in the third era that the UK established by the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1984 (now the DPA 
1998), and (ii) the development of sui generis computer chip protection was probably the first such ‘pipes’ 
regime. The protection of layout designs of integrated circuits as a specific subject matter was first mooted 
in the United States and resulted, in 1984, with the approval of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 
(the SCPA, which was codified at 17 U.S.C. §901-914 (1988)) and in the EU (Council Directive 
87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the legal protection of topographies of semiconductor products).  
International negotiations led to the adoption, in 1989, of the Washington Treaty (the Washington Treaty 
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits). 
37 In the view of these authors, the Washington Treaty is now obsolete. 
38 E.g. Merrill Lynch’s Application [1989] RPC 561 on patentability of software. 
39 See section 2.1, above. 
40 See footnote 13, supra. 
41 The introduction of a sui generis database right by the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 
1997 (SI 1997/3032), following the Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases 96/9/EC, to 
supplement copyright protection of databases as literary works (s.3A CDPA 1988). 
42 Curiously, it was not until 1995 that a definition of the term ‘Internet’ was agreed (see Federal 
Networking Council (FNC) Resolution, Definition of “Internet”, October 24, 1995 (available at 
http://www.nitrd.gov/fnc/Internet_res.html).  For our purposes, ‘Internet’ can be defined as the global 
network of ‘pipes’ that provides electronic connection between computers enabling them to communicate 
with each other. 
43 The Web, as it is known, was a key ‘pipes’ innovation developed by the UK academic Professor Tim 
Berners-Lee and first implemented in 1990.  The Web is usually defined as the system of interlinked 
hypertext documents that can be accessed via the Internet.  Simply put, the Web is a ‘place’ on the Internet 
(websites such as www.soton.ac.uk) where one finds interlinked content that is based on an Internet 
standard – hypertext (http).  So, when you use Google to find a website you are directly using the Web, but 
when you use a modern telephone system (mobile or landline) you are directly using the Internet. 
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significant growth in software applications developed by industry and a growing interest 
in establishing proprietary interests in IT content, all characterise this era. 
 
Thus, technical innovations fuelled what can be regarded as a huge cultural shift from a 
quasi-academic ‘science’-based Internet culture to a commercialised Internet space.  A 
wide variety of business models were explored during this era, fuelling the so-called dot-
com boom.  However, with the birth of e-commerce, attendant legal problems relating to 
jurisdiction
44, dispute resolution and intellectual property rights arose.  Legal challenges 
posed by the Internet in this era were not confined to private law: privacy issues and ‘e-
crime’ concerns were also prevalent.  Yet in both private and public law the legal 
response was frequently technology-specific. 
 
The fourth era, then, was one that posed great challenges and significant transition in a 
variety of contexts – technical, cultural, commercial and legal.  
 
2.2.5  The Fifth Era: Social Diffusion (2002 onwards) 
 
So far, the current era has witnessed further commercialisation and an exponential 
increase in the use of the Internet.  It is during this time that we have seen the Web, in a 
meaningful sense, begin to realise some of its potential as a publishing medium.  The 
most obvious characteristic of this era is, again, a social consequence of technical 
developments to date – the rise of user-generated online content, characterised today 
with the sobriquet ‘Web 2.0’
45: thus the rise of applications as diverse as social 
networking
46, blogs
47, podcasts
48 and commercial Internet-based virtual reality 
environments
49. 
 
The rise of user-generated content has meant that the English language, although still 
prevalent, is no longer dominant in Web content; however the globalisation of the 
Internet has thrown into sharp relief the digital divide
50, and we must question the 
effectiveness of the international response to this
51.   For those on the ‘right’ side of the 
digital divide, the pervasiveness of technology in society is, today, extraordinary.  
However, meeting public expectations in areas such as enforcement and security (from 
national security to personal privacy) is a huge challenge.  The public want a safe Internet 
environment in which to conduct their day-to-day activities and they also want the 
authorities to control illegal and harmful content that might threaten the individual and 
society, but they want this without the perception or reality of unwarranted intrusiveness 
by the State or commerce.  Such concerns arise within the contexts of increased network 
capacity, the resultant increased content and technological sophistication of the general 
population (from tech-savvy children to the over 55s - the ‘silver surfers’).  
                                                 
44 See 2.4.1 below. 
45 Despite confident media reference to ‘Web 2.0’ there is no technical definition of this term.  It is 
generally taken to refer to second generation web-based communities and hosted services claiming to offer 
enhanced collaborative and information-sharing applications to users. 
46 E.g. Facebook (http://www.facebook.com/). 
47 Online diaries or ‘web logs’.  
48 User-friendly digital audio software which can be used to record webcasts or to broadcast Internet-based 
radio programmes.  
49 Such as Second Life (http://secondlife.com/). 
50 A euphemism commonly used to describe the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ of the Information Age. 
51 The international response recently featured two conferences, known as the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS).  The WSIS process has, in the view of these authors, so far generated a wide 
range of documents, policy and targets, but with negligible results. 
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One might characterise the fifth era as having a community rather than individualistic 
approach to IT usage.  There is recognition of the need for public law to support, by 
regulatory means, a safer online community.  Thus significant social change, supported 
by cheaper and ever more sophisticated and converging technology characterise the 
current era. 
 
Where we are seeing true technical innovation today is in military
52 use of IT and in 
advances in surveillance techniques
53 that can monitor behaviour online and offline, for 
the benefit of government authorities, commercial enterprises or criminals.  The resultant 
moral issues pose substantial regulatory challenges.  Also, significant technical steps 
forward have been made in research and development on further reducing computer 
size, and the development of new networks for the future and software for said 
networks.  Collective creativity is being facilitated by technology on a larger scale than 
ever before (e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page): this, as well as the reduced 
cost of publishing content, is forcing established commercial content providers to  re-
assess  their traditional business models. 
 
Lacking a historical perspective, it is difficult to discern at this stage the legal impact of 
the current era.  At present there is some evidence to suggest a return to generic – rather 
than technology-specific – regulation in the UK, and current and future technologies will 
certainly pose new challenges for UK law, but it is difficult to predict as yet what these 
will be and how the law will respond. 
  
2.2.6  Summary 
 
The authors believe that a number of technological and legal themes have evolved in the 
UK through the five eras.  From a technological perspective, for example, we have seen 
hardware and software development that has evolved beyond rare, expensive, hard-to-
use mainframe computers with numerical content to user-friendly, digital multimedia 
content on decentralised but accessible networks, and cheap computers.  Thus the 
evolution of the ‘pipes’ (technologies which the Internet community is fighting to keep 
as ‘open’ rather than becoming the property of one commercial entity) has driven the 
increasing availability and range of ‘content’.  Today, computers are pervasive and their 
increasing functionality and convergence can be expected to drive further increases in the 
quantity and forms of ‘content’. 
 
From a legal perspective we have seen a number of different formal legal responses, 
variously, generic and technology-specific in their approach to technological 
development and commercial pressures; which is to say that the law appears to play a 
reactive regulatory role
54.  However, this may not be the whole picture and it will be 
argued below
55 that other models of regulation have an important part to play in the 
regulation of IT.  Despite the technological value of openness (at least with regard to 
‘pipes’), there is increasing pressure to establish proprietary rights in ‘pipes’ and ‘content’ 
                                                 
52 For example, US military forces currently use Artificial Intelligence-assisted technology such as 
unmanned ‘drone’ aircraft and are currently developing the first generation of ‘robot’ soldiers. 
53 Such as, modern CCTV technology. 
54 A number of questions flow from this that cannot be answered in this essay: does the (slower) pace of 
regulation act as a break on technological development?  Can, and should, law lead technological 
development? 
55 See section 2.4, below. 
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(which contrasts with the technological value of openness and, in the fifth era, the 
increased community approach to IT usage); an issue which will be briefly re-visited in 
sections 3 and 4 below.  
 
2.3  What is IT Law? 
 
Defining the boundaries of IT law was a difficult task in the early years.  Indeed, early 
critics of the establishment of IT law as a separate discipline carped that IT law was 
merely a rag-bag of aspects of established legal disciplines such as contract law and 
intellectual property law. As noted above, IT law has since become established as a 
separate legal discipline; however, how should we define IT law?  The problem here was 
identified at the beginning of this essay:  the boundaries of IT law flex according to IT 
development.  The authors assert that the boundaries of IT law were diffuse in the first 
era, but began hardening in the second and third eras
56.  However the authors suspect 
that, throughout the fourth and current eras, the boundaries have again become diffuse: 
indeed, the syllabi of academic UK IT law courses has become highly diverse during this 
time and we see evidence that the more informal regulatory models are being used in 
practice (see section 2.4 below).  Moreover, the formal regulatory impact of information 
technologies is increasingly found within more traditional legal disciplines
57.  Perhaps this 
is reflective of the ubiquity of IT and technology convergence?  If these speculations are 
true – and further research is necessary here – then perhaps the question – is IT law 
really law? – has renewed practical, as well as academic, import.   
 
2.4  The Regulatory Context: a Critical Overview 
 
It was noted in section 2.2.6 above, that formal legal regulation provides only part of the 
regulatory framework for IT.  In this section, these questions and the import of more 
informal regulation will be considered (in 2.4.2) in proposing a theory of IT regulation.  
This theory, espoused in section 2.4.3, consists of five regulatory models; characterised as 
three standard regulatory models
58 and two alternative models
59.  It is these constructs 
that the authors argue can be discerned from the present study of IT law.  
 
2.4.1  Jurisdiction: a brief note 
 
Before these models are introduced, it should be noted that as modern IT facilitates 
communications and activities across national borders, an important aspect of its 
regulation must be enforcement: and that leads us to the topic of jurisdiction.  As noted 
in the Introduction to this essay, the authors have had to be selective in choosing the 
topics for critical discussion.  Jurisdiction is one such omission, but it is relevant to note 
that the authors refute what has been termed ‘the cyberspace fallacy’
60, i.e. the view that 
the internet is a virtual space over which no jurisdiction has de facto or de jure control of 
activities.  The authors, along with numerous commentators and most IT legal 
                                                 
56 At which point IT law could be said to encompass – amongst others - telecommunications law, 
intellectual property law, the law of e-commerce and e-crime law. 
57 E.g. the impact of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013, on UK 
contract law, and of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 on UK criminal law.  
58 The technological model (regulating technology by technology), the legal model (regulating technology by law) 
and the hybrid model (regulating technology by a combination of law and technology). 
59 These being ‘soft’ legal regulation and the trust-based regulatory model. 
60 A term coined by Prof. Chris Reed – see Reed, C. “Internet Law: Text and Materials” 2nd edition, 
Cambridge University Press at p.1 – one of the many commentators who has written on the topic of 
jurisdiction in IT law. 
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practitioners
61, accord with the view that the actors in internet activity are, in essence, 
human - using human-designed software and physical equipment (hardware).  Ultimately, 
both the human and hardware elements are based in legal jurisdictions and are, thus, 
within the reach of national laws and therefore subject to legal regulation. 
 
2.4.2  The Role of Institutions in IT Regulation 
 
In assessing what drives IT law development it is important to note the role of 
institutions working within their spheres to develop policy, standards and compliance 
processes.  Both general and technological institutions have been very important in the 
genesis of both IT and IT law, with examples of the former including the United Nations 
(UN) and the Organisation of Economic Co-operative Development (OECD).  In this 
context much of what has been achieved thus far has largely been accomplished by ‘soft 
law’ processes i.e. not by the sledgehammer of legislation but by codes of practice, often 
negotiated voluntarily with regulatory authorities, designed to promote best practice and 
to minimise formal action.  Technological measures taken as a result of industry 
collaboration and co-operation with public authorities may also provide a greater 
deterrent, for example to online criminal activity, than sterner criminal sanctions alone.  
 
In some instances the issue has gone full circle with evidence, for example, that the 
police are increasingly calling on the banks to take necessary enforcement action to tackle 
credit card fraud rather than for the police themselves to investigate and prosecute such 
activity through the courts.  Whilst the banking industry clearly has responsibilities to 
minimise fraud, there are dangers should this approach to policing extend to other less 
well supported crime victims where the individual may feel that he or she is on their own 
against the criminal. 
 
The increasing complexity of the challenge is also encouraging the establishment of 
partnerships and national specialist agencies such as SOCA – the Serious Organised 
Crime Agency - which is an executive non-departmental public body sponsored by, but 
operationally independent from, the Home Office
62.  SOCA tackles a range of criminal 
activity and abuse involving the use of IT in perpetration.  By contrast the Internet 
Watch Foundation
63 operates on a non-statutory basis, funded by the EU and the online 
industry, to minimise the availability of potentially illegal content online. 
 
Internationally, the blend of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ law activity continues through the auspices 
of technological organisations such as the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU).  The ITU is a United Nations Agency within the information and communication 
technologies acting as a “global focal point for governments and the private sector” 
within the areas of radio communication, standardisation and development.  Established 
by the first International Telegraph Convention in 1865 its 191 Member States and 700 
sector members and associates work together to establish global policies for the global 
telecommunication environment while developing standards for emerging new systems.  
                                                 
61 A fair reflection of the average UK IT legal practitioner’s perspective is that whilst it is not legally difficult 
to establish jurisdiction (the global nature of the Internet means that a single IT activity usually will fall 
within UK jurisdiction, and indeed, that of other countries: principally the U.S.), there may be practical 
barriers to achieving this and to then enforcing UK rights and laws; and the time and effort this can 
involve often meaning that the cost may preclude enforcement from being commercially feasible.  In this 
area, as with so many other issues, the response of the practitioner is to reduce his client’s risk via creative 
use of contract law. 
62 See: http://www.soca.gov.uk/aboutUs/index.html. 
63 See: http://www.iwf.org.uk/public/page.103.htm. 
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At the apex the global summits and plenipotentiary conferences define the direction for 
exploitation and development of the global telecoms resource.  
 
Via similar mechanisms of international treaties, working groups, meetings and 
assemblies, another international organisation - the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) - also works with more than 90% of countries in the world, and a 
wide range of stakeholders and organisations, inter alia, “to promote the protection of 
intellectual property throughout the world through co-operation among States and, 
where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international organisation”.  Thus 
WIPO has been instrumental in developing international IP laws and standards 
consistent with the demands of the online world which have then been implemented 
within the domestic law of its member states. 
 
So whilst there is little dispute that international collaboration is essential to enable the 
‘pipes’ to deliver what governments, business and consumers want, it is less clear what 
regulatory contributions are required when the technology and its applications filter 
though into everyday life.  At that level, particularly in relation to ‘content’, the priorities 
and politics of nation states kick in along with the everyday demands of business and the 
public, all of which will temper and influence the priorities and pressures for regulatory 
development.  This means of course that regulatory differences may emerge between 
nations in the actions taken.  This is particularly the case with regard to the sensitive issue 
of online content regulation which some governments see as vital to the maintenance of 
the regime in power.  
 
In assessing the contribution of public law towards information technology the approach 
in terms of legislation has always been to lay down parameters and to permit the law to 
evolve within the interpretation of the regulators, including the courts.  This can be seen 
in the UK in the functioning of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (as amended) and the 
Data Protection Acts 1984 and 1998.  Public law has also been a facilitator of 
modernisation.  For example, section 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 
permits the appropriate Minister to modify legislation so as to facilitate electronic 
communication or storage as an alternative to traditional hardcopy methods in a wide 
variety of formal contexts.  This includes electronic alternatives to documentary 
evidence. Although used sparingly by government the measure does at least fulfil the 
modernising responsibilities that such provisions imply.  The direct effect of such 
measures contrasts well against the achievements of international treaties.  Despite their 
contribution to global or regional regulation, treaties can be slow in coming to fruition 
and inflexible when legally binding on signatory states. 
 
If one can step outside public law for a moment and focus on public sector policy 
towards IT one can see governments striving to gain the financial efficiencies that IT can 
offer.  In the UK, public sector policy towards e-Government for example has grown 
from an aspiration to improve government services into a transformational government 
agenda designed to radically change the way government operates in the delivery of 
public services.  However, despite much effort in this regard, reports of inadequacies and 
failings in the modernisation of public sector IT infrastructure and the evident needs of 
policymaking for a more sophisticated government information policy, demonstrate that 
there is still much to be done.  
 
2.4.3  A Theory of IT Legal Regulation 
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The authors tentatively hypothesise that five distinct regulatory models can be discerned 
from the legal regulation of IT in the UK.  It should be made clear from the outset that 
these regulatory models are not alternatives: they can be complementary to each other 
and can also be rather promiscuous (thus, combinations of the different models can 
evolve in practice).  Below, each model is briefly described with their attendant 
advantages and disadvantages critically analysed in outline.  
 
2.4.3.1  The Standard IT Regulatory Models 
 
It is difficult to think of examples of the technological regulatory model (technology 
regulating technology) outside computer engineering itself.  The ‘architecture’ of the 
‘pipes’ of the Internet is regulated by technology; what we might term macro-technological 
regulation, however it is difficult to see where else the technological model could be 
useful.  A rare example might be so-called vigilante justice websites, such as 
http://hollabacknyc.blogspot.com/ (which ‘empowers’ New Yorkers to ‘holla back’ at 
street harassers). This rare (and antisocial) form of ‘content’ could be characterised as a 
form of micro-technological regulation of social behaviour in public places.  Overall the 
technological model does not appear to have great import outside computer engineering 
because, in practice, most regulatory use of technology takes place in concert with 
proprietary rights, contract or public law. 
 
Yet, regulation of technology purely by law (the legal model) carries its own risks: 
principally that of legal obsolescence.  As discussed earlier in this essay, two common 
forms of IT legal regulation are generic regulation and sui generis regulation: many of the 
examples discussed earlier have employed the legal regulatory model which appears to be 
the most common model employed in formal IT law.  However, we are increasingly 
seeing new laws that would fall into the hybrid model, i.e. regulation that employs a 
combination of law and technology.  The hybrid model would seem to be both more 
useful than the technological model and at less risk of legal obsolescence.  A good 
example of this is digital rights management in the context of copyright law (see section 
4.2 below). 
 
2.4.3.2  The Alternative IT Regulatory Models 
 
As pointed out above, the potential applications of the technological model are relatively 
narrow.  Further, by their nature both the legal and hybrid models are dependent on 
legislative or common law developments (or at least on contractual relationships).  
However, these standard regulatory models do not appear to reflect the whole picture of 
legal regulatory practice within IT.  Not only does IT provide a technical and fast-moving 
environment for regulation, but we have to contend with the actions of important 
institutions (see section 2.4.2 above) as well as the ever-evolving human activities that IT 
facilitates.  Consequently, more flexible, policy-based and ‘bottom-up’ regulatory 
approaches are needed.  It is therefore unsurprising that the academic legal literature 
suggests that other forms of regulation are evolving to fill this ‘regulatory gap’.  In 
generalist academic legal literature there is an acceptance that so-called soft law
64 has a 
regulatory role to play and in academic circles there is some discussion of trust-based 
regulation.  This accords with the authors’ own experience as to how IT is regulated in 
                                                 
64 For example, it has been used in EU law (e.g. Senden, L. “Soft Law in European Community Law” (Hart 
Publishing, 2004).  Soft law can be defined as regulation by non-binding instruments: such instruments 
might include resolutions, codes of conduct, guidelines and recommendations.  
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practice: that there are alternative regulatory models, which we have characterised in this 
essay as the soft law model and the trust-based model. 
 
A ‘pipes’ example of the soft law model would be IT protocols and standards (such as 
the TCP/IP protocol) and a content example would be the Internet Watch Foundation
65.  
One can also see that soft law, combined with contract law, is increasingly used to deal 
with a range of private law issues over which there is relatively little formal legal 
regulation; this evolution of the soft law model might be characterised as a ‘hybrid-soft 
model’ regulatory approach. 
 
Trust-based regulation is technically a feature of the decentralised infrastructure of the 
Web
66 and has traditionally been part of the ‘science’-based ethos of IT.  Although trust 
infuses the ‘pipes’ of the web
67 it is difficult to see a trust ethos being widely used in a 
commercial environment, but there are some examples of this ranging from Google
68 to 
eBay
69. 
 
2.4.4  Summary 
 
As we have seen, there is a plethora of regulatory actors (law-makers, judges, institutions, 
etc) in IT.  It is our submission that there is also a wide choice of regulatory models that 
have been and are being used in the regulation of IT.  The authors consider that this 
pluralism is a strength, rather than a weakness, of IT law, but concede that it may add 
credence to the argument that IT law is not law (see sections 2.1 and 2.3 above).  
Nevertheless, there is the regulatory flexibility to adopt different models for different 
contexts. 
 
There are two additional factors that, in practice, can be expected to add complexity to 
this regulatory theory: (i) that the five regulatory models can variously be directed to the 
‘pipes’, ‘content’, or a combination of both (to good or ill effect) and, (ii) that the 
regulation of modern IT is a global task, while regulation is primarily at the national level, 
so this can lead to regulatory competition.   
 
These regulatory insights, together with earlier elements from this essay, will now be 
brought to bear in a brief consideration of modern examples of ‘pipes’ and ‘content’ legal 
issues (respectively, sections 3 and 4, below). 
 
3  IT Infrastructure (‘the pipes’) 
3.1  An Exemplar: Software Patents 
                                                 
65 The IWF plays an important, but informal, UK-focused co-ordinating role in controlling Internet 
content that includes child sex abuse, obscene content and content that incites racial hatred.  Individuals 
can notify the IWF of such content via the IWF hotline; the IWF subsequently alerts the relevant hosting 
service providers that criminal content is found on their servers (see 
http://www.iwf.org.uk/public/page.2.htm). 
66 Professor Tim Berners-Lee refers to these as ‘social mechanisms’ (e.g. see his Testimony  before the 
United States House of Representatives’ Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and the Internet Hearing on the "Digital Future of the United States: Part I -The 
Future of the World Wide Web”.  See http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2007/03/01-ushouse-future-of-the-
web.html).  
67  This is why the Web is, at a technical level, vulnerable to abuses of trust – spam (unsolicited e-mail) is 
the prime example of such an abuse. 
68 Google has an informal corporate motto: "Don't be evil." (see http://investor.google.com/conduct.html). 
69 Trust metrics are important to eBay users: see, for example, 
http://pages.ebay.co.uk/services/forum/feedback.html.
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As noted earlier in this essay, many key aspects of the ‘pipes’ take the form of software.  
The purpose of this section is to briefly reflect on the issue of software patents. 
 
First, a brief overview of UK patent law in this context is needed.  Under the Patents Act 
1977 (PA 1977)
70 a patent, a property right, can be granted to inventions that are novel, 
capable of an inventive step and are industrially applicable.  However, s.1(2)(c) PA 1977 
provides that ‘a computer program…..is not an invention as such.’  UK patent law is 
heavily influenced by an EEA system – the European Patent Convention (EPC) 1973, as 
interpreted by the European Patent Office
71 (EPO)
72, and it was the influence of the 
latter that led UK courts over the years to make it clear that inventions incorporating 
software are not necessarily to be regarded as being ‘computer programs as such’ (and 
thus, excluded from patentability): where a computer program has a technical effect, such 
inventions may be deemed to escape the restriction of s.1(2)(c) PA 1977. 
 
There are a number of issues that arise here.  Firstly, the PA 1977 can be categorised as 
an example of the legal regulatory model.  Secondly, the wording of s.1(2)(c) PA 1977 is 
clearly influenced by the old ‘hardware/software’ distinction: s.1(2)(c) providing that 
hardware is potentially patentable but software is not an invention ‘as such’.  However, 
latter interpretation of this section (which allows inventions incorporating software to be 
patentable where there is a technical effect) can be seen as an example of the adaptation 
of existing law to meet the perceived needs of the software industry
73.  An interesting 
development in this area is the presence of a collective and individual technological 
backlash – in the form of the Open Source and Free Software movements
74 - to the 
patenting of software applications.  The result being that for basic personal and office 
use, there is a choice between patented proprietary software (e.g. Microsoft) or open-
source applications (e.g. Linux); thus, the IT community (not the legal system) has 
delivered consumer choice.  
 
As implied above, software patents is an example of an area of law where the old 
‘hardware/software’ distinction was applied, but has subsequently broken down.  It is 
interesting to speculate as to what might happen if UK patent law abandoned this old 
distinction entirely. Clearly this would necessitate the reference to software in s.1(2)(c) 
PA 1977 being removed
75- while the ‘pipes/content’ distinction in UK patent law might 
offer a useful alternative basis for lawmaking
76. Opponents of software patents would 
clearly like to retain the ‘hardware/software’ distinction, and strengthen the impact of 
s.1(2)(c) PA 1977, but the authors believe that this academic debate should be more 
                                                 
70 Please note, further changes to the PA 1977 are expected: all references to this Act were correct at the 
time of writing. 
71 See http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo.html.  
72 Although UK patent jurisprudence has recently diverged from the EPC jurisprudence on computer 
programs (see the Court of Appeal’s decision in Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1371). 
73 Most commentators agree that the EPO’s interpretation of the EPC 1973, and the subsequent UK, 
adaptation of the technical effect doctrine in relation to the PA 1977, were a result of regulatory 
competition with the US (where software patents are more readily available). 
74 These are examples of two of the social movements, with their origins in the technology community, 
which support and foster the development of non-proprietary software.  For example, see the GNU 
Project at http://www.gnu.org/). 
75 It should be noted that, as a signatory of the EPC 1973, the UK is not currently in a position to 
unilaterally make such important changes to the PA 1977.  
76 It should be noted that UK patent law already contains restrictions on inventions to be used for certain 
functions (e.g. methods used in medical treatment, surgery and diagnosis in s.4 PA 1977) so there are prior 
examples, for policy reasons, of the use of functional distinctions in determining patentability. 
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realistic, and that adaptation of the ‘pipes/content’ distinction could lead to better and 
more creative law-making in patent law. 
 
Further development of the ‘pipes/content’ distinction might lead to a more nuanced 
approach to software patents.  Given the existence (and growing success) of Open 
Source and Free Software, it is the authors’ opinion that IT innovation and consumer 
choice does not appear to have unduly suffered from the patenting of software 
applications.  What is of concern to the authors though is the growing trend of 
commercial entities trying (through patent law and other means) to establish proprietary 
rights in IT standards.  Here, we would argue that the commercial monopolisation of IT 
standards can only have a detrimental effect on consumer choice and future innovation.  
Thus, we believe that establishing property rights in high level ‘pipes’ such as IT 
standards is inappropriate, whereas establishing property rights in low level ‘pipes’, such 
as software applications, may be less harmful in terms of innovation.  Developing the 
‘pipes/content’ distinction along these lines
77 within patent law might address these 
concerns: distinguishing high level ‘pipes’ (which would be excluded from patentability 
on policy grounds) from low level ‘pipes’.  This is an interesting suggestion which 
requires further research, but the key point here is that current patent law appears ill-
equipped to deal with the monopolisation of IT standards, and, at present, it is left to 
competition law to attempt to regulate this issue. 
 
4 IT  Content 
4.1 Content  Generation 
 
There are a wide range of important legal issues relating to IT content.  For example, 
how should the UK regulate children’s access to dangerous Web content such as audio-
visual recordings of ‘tombstoning’ stunts
78 and damaging ‘pro-ana’ tips
79 on social 
networking sites such as Bebo and Facebook?  If a person directs their avatar, their digital 
embodiment, to engage in undesirable behaviour in a virtual reality world such as Second 
Life should this give rise to a criminal prosecution?  Although, in these examples, 
contractual relationships would provide the basis for some content regulation; is it 
desirable for justice to be privatised in this way?  Or, is contract law the best mechanism 
given the techno-legal obstacles to UK regulation of any website activity?  As a global 
medium, with actors that are often geographically disparate and the servers for the 
relevant websites often being based outside the UK, there is only so much that can be 
achieved by the UK acting alone.  Would Web content best be regulated technically (e.g. 
by making ISPs formally liable for Web content that they host)?  Would legal regulation 
be helpful (some sort of international treaty on Web content)?  Or some combination of 
the two?  These are questions that require further research. 
  
However, in the absence of international treaties, contract currently provides the most 
effective way of formally regulating general Internet content; but contract only provides 
                                                 
77 The imprecise nature of this high level/low level ‘pipes’ distinction is conceded, but a similarly imprecise 
distinction – that of macro-biological and micro-biological processes (PA1977, Schedule A2 s.3(f)) is 
already used in UK patent law.  It should be noted that there may also be consumer and innovation 
benefits in distinguishing between ‘high level’ and ‘low level’ ‘content’ in copyright law, but further 
discussion of this is beyond the scope of this essay. 
78 Where untrained individuals jump off high vantage points (piers, harbour walls, cliffs etc.) into the sea.  
The (consensual) recordings of such stunts usually include images of the serious injuries or deaths that 
result. 
79 That is, pro-anorexia tips on dieting and the avoidance of medical intervention. 
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an indirect form of content regulation.  In section 4.2 below, the main example of direct 
formal regulation of original content, copyright law, is considered in more detail. 
 
4.2  An Exemplar: Copyright and P2P Music Networks 
 
A relatively recent issue within IT academe is the regulation of so-called peer-to-peer 
(P2P) computer networks
80 upon which MP3 music files are exchanged.  As with any 
unauthorised use of copyright works, sharing an MP3 file, without the permission of the 
copyright proprietor(s) via an unauthorised peer-to-peer network, clearly constitutes 
copyright infringement.  Although this fact causes some consternation amongst young 
UK music fans, this is both clear and appropriate in the eyes of the authors: what is of 
concern to the authors is the extent of copyright in this area. 
 
First, a brief summary of the UK copyright regime is appropriate.  Copyright is a 
property right, governed by the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988), 
that subsists in certain categories of works, including: original literary works (most forms 
of written matter, including song lyrics); musical works (e.g. song melodies), and, sound 
recordings
81.  There is significant regional and international regulation of copyright, 
which has had great influence on the UK regime, with clear evidence that the 
international copyright regime has been adapted in the light of the challenges that digital 
content poses
82.  In the view of the authors, copyright is the de facto mechanism whereby 
the original content of the digital age is directly regulated. 
 
However, academics such as Lessig
83 have pointed out that copyright is conceptually 
unsuited to regulate digital content. Copyright (‘copy right’) developed around the concept 
of copying as the cornerstone to copyright infringement. But with digitised copyright 
material, mere access to a work
84 technically involves copying and thus, constitutes copyright 
infringement.  It should be noted that the civil and criminal consequences of copyright 
infringement per se are both significant and broad
85.  At a fundamental level, therefore, 
copyright law is ill-adapted to the digital environment.  There are additional 
complications relating to the regulatory ‘pipes’ that many copyright works flow through.  
Permission to use copyright works is traditionally garnered from the network of national 
collecting societies
86 (to whom copyright proprietors traditionally cede the tasks of 
monitoring use of and collecting revenue from use of their copyright works). But with 
digital content it is technically possible to avoid or supplement this. Technologies for 
restricting and tracking usage (e.g. encryption and digital watermarking) and collecting 
revenue (e.g.  iTunes) collectively are known as digital rights management (DRM).  As in 
most other jurisdictions, controversially both common law
87 and statute
88 now afford 
                                                 
80 A typical P2P computer network is based on an application which utilises the Internet to allow users to 
exchange content with each other, either directly or through a mediating server. 
81 See ss.3 and 5A CDPA 1988. 
82 For example, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 1996. 
83 First posited in Lessig, L. “Code and other Laws of Cyberspace”, Persus, 1999. 
84 Which, with non-digital works, typically does not constitute copyright infringement. 
85 For example, see ss.96(2), 97 and 107 CDPA 1988.  
86 For example, the Performing Rights Society in the UK. 
87 Sony Computer Entertainment Inc v Edmunds [2002] All ER (D) 170.  Affording protection, thus, to DRM is 
a clear example of establishing proprietary rights in ‘pipes’. 
88 This sui generis protection has been achieved by the introduction in the CDPA 1988 of civil remedies 
against the act of circumvention as well as the making and dealing in circumvention devices and the 
provision of circumvention services (CDPA 1988 ss.296(2), 296ZA(3) and 296ZD).  Criminal sanctions 
(CDPA 1988 s.296ZB) are only available against the making and dealing in circumvention devices and the 
provision of circumvention services.  This is controversial legally (because CDPA 1988 ss.296 and 296ZA 
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direct protection to DRM.  Thus, via copyright and sui generis DRM protection we have 
what the authors’ term a digital format dichotomy, i.e. the same content is treated differently 
in law depending on whether it is in analogue or digital form. 
 
Returning to our exemplar – let us illustrate the impact of this with two scenarios. Say 
person A buys a new analogue music record and listens to it both on his own record-
player and that of a friend (person B).  A then lends, on a non-remunerative basis, the 
record to another friend (person C); none of these activities could constitute 
infringement under the CDPA 1988.  However, undertaking substantially the same activities 
on an online, authorised MP3 music service would give rise to liability and penalties 
under the CDPA 1988: where A paid to access an MP3 file from such a service 
(company Z), both downloading and listening to the file is technically copyright 
infringement (although A’s contract with Z would usually allow for this.  However, A 
may only be able to access the music file for a certain period of time or a certain number 
of times
89).  It would almost certainly constitute copyright infringement
90 for A to listen 
to the MP3 file on a friend’s computer and similarly for A to e-mail or otherwise 
distribute the MP3 file to C.  To extend this scenario, if A became frustrated with the 
lack of functionality of the music supplied by company Z, ‘cracked’ the DRM 
technologies applied and posted guidance on how to ‘crack’ Z’s DRM technologies on a 
website, this would give rise to criminal sanctions. 
 
In summary, works in digital format are less functional and subject to more robust 
copyright regulation than those in analogue form.  Whilst this may be justifiable in terms 
of the interests of the right-holder (whose digital content can be more easily exploited 
without authorisation than equivalent analogue content), and may even have some 
benefits for the consumer (an authorised MP3 music file may well be cheaper than the 
equivalent offline version), the authors question whether copyright is an appropriate 
mechanism for regulating original digital content or whether sui generis regulation of 
original digital content might be the way forward.  This is clearly an area that requires 
further research. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
In this essay the authors have critically explored the relationship between technology and 
law in a way that, they hope, is of interest to the non-IT lawyer and specialist IT lawyer 
alike.  By way of background, the authors have posited that the development of IT and 
UK IT law can be divided into five eras (section 2.2).  More fundamentally, the necessity 
for a new paradigm for IT law has been discussed: the old hardware/software distinction 
is no longer useful from a technological perspective, so why should we expect it to be 
useful in academic analysis?  Further research, including comparative research, will be 
required to explore how the best regulatory environment for ‘pipes’ and ‘content’ can be 
secured: as this is where the authors believe the future of IT law lies. 
 
Other contributions of this essay are to be found in the consideration of the academic 
context of IT law (section 2.1, but also section 2.3). Here the authors suggest that IT law 
                                                                                                                                            
have had the effect of making DRM a form of quasi-property when applied to copyright works) and in 
practice (because copy-protected material often has reduced functionality, e.g. some forms of copy-
protection will prevent CDs from being played on a computer). 
89 There are no such contractual restrictions in the analogue scenario, above. 
90 Also, DRM would make this technically difficult.  Further, circumventing any DRM would also give rise 
to a separate cause of action in copyright. 
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may have come full circle as a legal subject – from an ill-defined emergent topic to a 
separate legal subject, to now, where there is some evidence of IT issues ‘filtering back’ 
to traditional legal subjects.  The modern academic study of IT law arguably has parallels 
with that of jurisprudence: perhaps it is evolving into a ‘meta-subject’, one that can 
provide insight as to how the law/technology relationship should be managed within the 
context of other traditional legal subjects. 
 
Another contribution of this essay is to be found in the hypothesis that IT law can be 
characterised as utilising five different, sometimes complementary, regulatory models 
(section 2.4).  Further insights into IT legal regulation are to be found in sections 3 and 4.  
 
The authors believe that these insights may be fundamental in considering how IT law 
should evolve in the future. 
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